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## **METAPHOR AS A POLITICAL TECHNOLOGY**

**Abstract.** *Discussions of political metaphors provide fertile grounds for understanding issues in political theory and political practice. The article departs from the established theoretical and methodological approaches to political metaphor (e.g., classical, conceptual, hermeneutical, cognitive) to introduce (post)structuralist and (post)Marxist methodological and theoretical bases. It maintains that the established approaches to the study of functionalities and ontologies of political metaphors are possible, primarily by researching their functioning in political discourses and as events in the power/truth dispositive. Metaphors can be researched as specific political technologies (strategies of power) that influence/create regimes of truth.*

**Keywords:** *political metaphors, political theory, linguistic theory, political discourse, power, knowledge*

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### **Introduction**

In *Poetics*, Aristotle points to the usefulness of a metaphor by emphasising its creative potential and character. Contrary to Aristotle, by employing rigorous grammatical analysis classical linguists reduce metaphor to a mere figure of speech, an ornament of language, with no added functionalities. Later, cognitive linguists and proponents of hermeneutics 'rediscovered' the functionalities of the metaphor that stretch beyond language. Contemporary approaches to metaphor, e.g., Georg Lakoff and Mark Johnson's conceptual metaphor, Paul Ricoeurs' hermeneutics of metaphor, Andrew Ortony's or Raymond W. Gibbs' interest in metaphor within cognitive science, consider it as a much more useful 'tool' that yields knowledge about the world beyond words, while revealing social and political schemata that are not immediately clear. Nonetheless, research on metaphor largely remains confined to the linguistic and cognitive theoretical approaches.

The aim of this article is to move beyond the well-established theoretical and methodological approaches and position metaphor as 'political',

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thereby opening it up in terms of its functionality. By constructing a political metaphor anew, we seek to establish a theoretical and methodological alternative to the existing approaches and widen the possible scope of metaphor for analysing socio-political realities. The dominant linguistic and cognitive methodological framing of metaphor, where metaphor is understood as part of language formation, as a tool of language and communication, will be re-considered in line with (post)Marxist and (post)structuralist methodology. Further, the re-examination of different theories of metaphors – classical and contemporary – will enable us to open the field of the meta-metaphorical and grasp social and political phenomena differently. We shall argue that the conception of ‘political metaphor’ based upon Foucauldian power relations goes beyond the *word-games* or textual analyses offered by hermeneutics and, when entering the field of politics, metaphor becomes a political technology. In this sense, metaphor in the interplay of diverse discourses sheds light on specific socio-political relationships.

We argue that linguistic, cognitive and hermeneutical traditions lack the power to elaborate the ‘real’ potential/effect of a metaphor. We try to demonstrate that metaphor is more than just a linguistic structure and is more an *event*, thus a discursive practice. Drawing from the Foucauldian methodological position and its theoretical concepts, we try to ‘reveal’ the metaphor’s material effect, which is broader than word-based or thought-based metaphor theories. Within this framework, we attempt to formulate a concept of metaphor as a political technology, the point where we basically ‘ground’ our notion of metaphor as a ‘circular relationship’ of power and truth – as a discursive construction that indicates a certain socio-political reality or ‘determines’ what is to be tru(th)e. The (post)Marxist account of language and Foucauldian conceptualisation of power will act as the starting point to position metaphor as a political technology.

### Methodological framing of metaphor

The initial question in our considerations is whether we can think about metaphor beyond its widely accepted and deeply rooted linguistic tradition. Most of the modern theories of metaphor, whether addressing its significance within social, cultural, cognitive, neural etc. fields, generally just ‘broaden’ the linguistic approach; namely, the semantics and semiotics of language. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of metaphor and Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor, for example, provide a notion that partially exceeds ‘classical’ definitions. Their understanding of metaphor is based on the theory of language that is creative and fluid in nature, yet does not go beyond the linguistic field since it reduces discourse to statements or text (as basic units of language). This implies the existence of a homogeneity of meaning:

a 'hermeneutic circulation' between text and context or a 'cognitive function' revealing the 'hidden meaning'. A methodological 're-framing' of metaphor seems to be essential for 'deconstructing' the linguistic dominance of the understanding of metaphor. A re-examination of metaphor at the intersection of three methodological positions – hermeneutical, archaeological, genealogical, and partly also (cognitive) linguistics – calls for metaphor to be established in the sphere of discourse to be able to reveal its ability to (re)produce socio-political effects and hence point to its ability to transform socio-political events.

Hermeneutical position, primarily in Gadamer's "hermeneutic circle", Ba(k)htin/Voloshinov's "dialogical hermeneutics", and Ricoeur's "hermeneutics of suspicion", provide fertile grounds for breaking with the monological understanding of language. Hermeneutics shows that metaphor has a role/function in creating the socio-political reality by giving meanings to things and events, that it can represent them in a certain way, and expose certain meanings and conceal others. Ricoeur's (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983) "hermeneutic of suspicions" assumes that individuals do not have direct access to the meaning of their own discourses and practices, but, and here Ricoeur remains Heideggerian, an essential continuity exists between everyday intelligibility and certain profound intelligibility, which everyday views tend to mask. The interpretation, as Gadamer (Ricoeur, 1974: 107; Wilson and Hutchinson, 1991; Laverty, 2003) puts it, is the process of discovering/revealing new forms of being; the hermeneutics is "dialectical circulation" between discovering the world and self-understanding. It is the articulation and revealing of profound, deep meanings (McGaughey, 1988: 423). Ricoeur acknowledges that we can really identify/discern the meaning, or it can be disclosed, only with a consideration of the specific context of the text. Despite the important conclusion drawn by Ricoeur – only in context can meaning be known – language remains, as Gadamer (2004: 389) notes, the "universal medium" for discovering knowledge/understanding: only through language can we see *Sache*, the Thing itself, the truth that one seeks to comprehend. According to Gadamer (Grondin, 2006: 16–19), the interpretation is not subjective, which the author has intended, but the reality of a particular (historical) event. Interpretation does not appear as such and instead disappears into the work itself:

*[...] understanding is always more than merely re-creating someone else's meaning. Questioning opens up possibilities of meaning, and thus what is meaningful passes into one's own thinking on the subject [...] To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were. (Gadamer, 2004: 368–371)*

Gadamer's "hermeneutic circle" and Voloshinov's "dialectical hermeneutic" break with the tradition of the existence of full transparency of language. Language and meaning (truth) become a question of the human experience. Bahtin (Dovič, 2002), with the "dialogical construction of language" whereby dialogue is understood as a minimal unit of actual language, made it very clear that language is not to be understood in an atomised sense, but as a communicative-social interaction (Dolinar, 1996; Bahtin and Voloshinov, 2005). The meaning is therefore the effect of this inter-action. Bahtin's (2003: 270-272) concept of *heteroglosia* points to what hermeneutics is lacking and what later became Foucault's major point of critique of the hermeneutical approach. *Heteroglosia* implies the multiplicity of languages as various forms of social speech and other rhetorical tools. Multiplicity does not refer to the heterogeneity and multiplicity of the meaning of words and phrases based on the signifier/signify distinction, but on *strategies*, as various ways of speaking and rhetorical strategies, which are immanent to every statement (Bahtin, 2002: 270-272).

Hermeneutics and cognitive linguistics position metaphor as a "creative thought" (Lakoff and Johnson) or "creative language" (Ricoeur). For Ricoeur (1973: 97), the "extraordinary attribute of words is their capability of meaning more than one thing". He sees the strategic nature of language in its three components: sentence as an actual carrier of the meaning and the whole creativity of language, polysemy as the potential creativity of the word, and metaphor as the third strategy of discourse, the poetic (Ricoeur, 1973). While Ricoeur finds that polysemy and deep meanings are immanent to language, its creative character or even excess of meaning - the strategy of language - Foucault sees power relations as a strategy immanent to every discourse. Although Foucault and Ricoeur agree that individual can see what an everyday behaviour means, he can even detect its deepest meanings masked by its everyday behaviour, "what neither he, nor authority directing the hermeneutical exegesis can see, is what exegetical situation is doing to both of them and why" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 124). For Foucault (Mottier in Pikalo and Carver, 2008: 186), the production of meaning is part of the wider discursive practices, institutions and power relations, and the point where hermeneutics and Foucault's archaeology and genealogy part ways. His formulation of a statement as a non-linguistic entity (as discourse), a statement as an *event*, positions metaphor in the field of power relations:

*To describe a group of statements not as the closed, plethoric totality of a meaning, but as an incomplete, fragmented figure; to describe a group of statements not with reference to the interiority of an intention, a thought, or a subject, but in accordance with the dispersion of an exteriority; to describe a group of statements, in order to rediscover*

*not the moment or the trace of their origin, but the specific forms of an accumulation, is certainly not to uncover an interpretation, to discover a foundation, or to free constituent acts; nor is it to decide on a rationality, or to embrace a teleology. It is to establish what I am quite willing to call positivity. To analyse a discursive formation therefore is to deal with a group of verbal performances at the level of the statements and of the form of positivity that characterizes them; or, more briefly, it is to define the type of positivity of a discourse. (Foucault, 1972: 125)*

Foucault's statement – as a discursive formation – is a historical analysis of the effects of a specific discourse on the socio-political reality. Foucault eliminates what hermeneutics are so eager to find, the profound and penetrating (Kuhn and Foucault, 2010a): “in the statement is not to find the unsaid, or what they are hiding. The proper question is the way on which they exist, the conditions of their existence” (Foucault, 1972: 119; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 11). Foucault clearly shows that the statement should be analysed on the level of production of the effects. A statement seen as an *event* (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 45; Fubion, 1954/1984: xxii) is Foucault's disposition, whereby power relations penetrate – produce, reproduce and transform – the whole socio-political reality. The polysemy that hermeneutics advocates is about searching for a new meaning. As such, it remains on the level of the sentence or semantic field. Words can produce heterogeneous meanings and constructions, yet remain on the level of a statement, even as polysemy (Foucault, 1972: 120). The unsaid, hidden or subtle, which interest hermeneutics, are also significant for an archaeologist according to what appears on the surface (uttered/said). Still, an archaeologist of discourse also analyses it as an effect of discourse, a “statement is always an event, that neither the language nor the meaning can't quite exhaust” (Foucault, 1972: 28). Archaeology analyses statements as systems of heterogeneous sets, governed by certain rules (rules of formations). Foucault's statement is not an isolated atom, but is constituted in the field of power relations – a statement not depending on linguistic elements (words and sentences) that determine its content, but on the constellations of power. That is where a statement emerges (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 54–55). Foucault's fundamental objective is to “determine specific forms of articulation” in archaeological writings *qua* power, as power relations in genealogy. With the “politics of the scientific statement” as a singular event, Foucault implies that discourse is a “constitution of different elements” – it is a singular event, yet simultaneously draws on heterogeneous forces; the referential, the subject (the positions he occupies), the field of enunciation where statements enter in the specific relationships, and the repeatable materiality to which the statements are subjected (Foucault, 2002: 112; Dolar, 2010: 60).

*Instead of being something said once and for all – and lost in the past like the result of a battle, a geological catastrophe, or the death of a king – the statement, as it emerges in its materiality, appears with a status, enters various networks and various fields of use, is subjected to transferences or modifications, is integrated into operations and strategies in which its identity is maintained or effaced. Thus the statement circulates, is used, disappears, allows or prevents the realization of a desire, serves or resists various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a theme of appropriation or rivalry. (Foucault: 1972: 105)*

Foucault's *statement-event* shows the immanence of power. The power as a strategy that penetrates all human practices – his language, cognition, institution, conducts, truth and body, the point where metaphor emerges within the “strategic play of power”, thus as a specific political technology.

The hermeneutical assumption of ‘deep’, contextual understanding of discourse implies the existence of a homogeneous discourse and in turn the possibility of determining a homogenous meaning. Cognitive linguists and hermeneutics disregard the broader socio-political context. Metaphor is reduced to the unit of a statement outlining how meaning is constituted in the given communication interaction (Mottier, 2008), that is, how metaphor structures human cognition and perception. The socio-political effects that metaphors produce are not taken into account – reinforcing, reproducing or undermining power (Mottier, 2008). Foucault's methodological account of the archaeology and genealogy of discourses enables an explication of the strategic notion of metaphor. The concept of *event* through which Foucault explains the “constitution” and function of discourse, and the one of *power*, opens up the possibility to think and construct metaphor also outside of language as a political technology.

## Metaphor – beyond semiotics towards semantics

Contemporary theories of metaphor are chiefly based on the semiotics of language where metaphor is reduced to a *figure/trope* (of speech). The focus for ‘non-classical’ theorists of metaphor is to move beyond the synchronic notion of metaphor, namely, the existence of a fundamental difference between *literal and metaphorical language* – the proper and the figurative. With his *interaction theory* (1954: 293), Max Black was probably the first to attempt to resolve this deeply rooted classical assumption. Interaction theory of metaphor tries to demonstrate that meaning is produced in certain relations, in an interactional relationship between “the undivided meaning of the statement and the focused meaning of the word”. (Ricoeur, 2003: 98). The metaphorical function is to select, accent, suppress or organise the features of

the primary subject referring to the statement of the secondary subject. For Black (Ricoeur, 1981: 89; Ortony, 1933: 21–33), metaphor is not a deviant naming, but the “unordinary usage of predicate” (Ricoeur, 1986: VI). However, remaining within the *proper-figurative* dichotomy, Black proposed that an actual distinction between them is not possible. As a result, using the proper or a more suitable word means the “loss of cognitive content” (Black, 1954: 293; Zashin and Chapman, 1974: Massen, 1995; Miller, 1992), implying that the ‘interaction metaphor’ cannot substitute the literal meaning without the original meaning (cognitive content) being lost. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in *Metaphors we live by* (1980/2003) subsequently extensively analysed the cognitive function of the metaphor. Cognitive linguists generally assume that *metaphor is the way of thinking* and understanding the reality. Apart from creating the reality, metaphor is the mental processing of things and events, since reality is irreducibly metaphorical. The metaphorical is an immanent “moment” in every thought (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003). In this sense, language becomes an extremely dynamic concept where the cognitive potential of the human mind enables diverse ‘colours’, perceptions and understandings. Lakoff and Johnson ontologically position metaphor within the relation of perception (the question of the nature of human cognition) and text (sentence). Language is the *mirror-image* of the operational and organisational modes of mind: “ontological mapping across domains, that is ontological mapping through source domain, from target domain” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1989/2003: 246; Lakoff, 1993: 278; Walter and Helmig, 2008: 125). Metaphorical meaning appears with the conceptual metaphorical mappings ultimately “originating” from the relation (correspondences) in our bodily experience, that is, from the (nature of) the body, interactions in the physical experiences and cultural practices (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980/2003). Accordingly, the aim of ‘conceptual theory’ is to demonstrate that metaphor is essentially a conceptual and not a linguistic entity, it ‘exists’ in thoughts (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980/2003; Lakoff, 1993: 320) and arises from the process of reasoning. Neural theories of language similarly suggest that metaphor emerges in the neurological networks as an “effect” of neural circuits (Feldman, 2003: Xii; Gibbs, 2008).

If metaphor is the way of thinking, then metaphorical expressions are inherently related to the conceptual system that is intrinsic (connected) to perception, cultural practices etc. Cognitive theories of metaphor suggest that metaphors influence our perception of socio-political events. While objective reality is mainly contested on the grounds of the power of human cognition, the aspect that neither cognitive linguists nor hermeneutics consider is the diversity of human practices and specific discourses (images, systems, authorities etc.) that produce, constitute and transform the entire socio-political »body«.

The existence of the literal, proper meaning implies the existence of an objective world where language occurs as uniform, constituted by transparent entities; language as inter-subjectively and trans-subjectively uniform (Pikalo, 2008: 41–54; cf. Pušnik, 2022: 315; cf. Kokol and Pikalo, 2015: 1091). This classical notion of language assumes that the language–mind relationship is univocal and transparent, whereby any irrationalities in language are the effects of its deviant usage, possibly occurring as metaphor. We could argue that in *Poetics and Rhetoric* Aristotle ‘invents’ metaphor as a rhetorical figure. By associating metaphor with a noun or a word rather than a discourse, Aristotle set the orientation vis-à-vis poetics and rhetoric for centuries (Ricoeur, 1981: 16; Aristoteles, 1959). However, at the same time the Aristotelian definition of metaphor is quite distinct: it has a unique structure (word) but two different functions, rhetorical and poetical – that of *trope* and that of *epiphora*. In Ricoeur’s opinion, *epiphora* – which means transposition – indirectly implies the semantic essence of a discourse. In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle (2004, 139) suggested the following conceptualisation of metaphor, as *epiphora*:

*Liveliness is specially conveyed by metaphor, and by the further power of surprising the hearer; because the hearer expected something different, his acquisition of the new idea impresses him all the more... Well-constructed riddles are attractive for the same reason; a new idea is conveyed, and there is metaphorical expression.*

In metaphor, Aristotle ‘fused’ two seemingly distinct elements, the strategic one (rhetorical, as *techne* of speech): “to make things visible/vivid” as they were in action (Aristotle, 2004), and as meaning, as making sense of it (the proper meaning of the word). In this context, in the strategic play of discourse Aristotle introduces the logical power of analogy and power of comparison – the power of making things visible, the power of speaking of the inanimate (Ricoeur, 1981: 43).

Ricoeur bases his theory of metaphor as a *metaphorical reference* on Aristotelian *poetics*, where metaphor is defined as *mimemisis*, Frege’s division between meaning and reference, and Benveniste’s ‘extension’ of reference to extra-linguistic reality – indicating the shift from semiotics to semantics. While semiotics applies to the inner relations of language – relations between signs, semantics alludes to the relation between sign and signification, namely, between language and the world (Benveniste, 1988: 36). Hermeneutics has two important distinctions when defining a discourse. Saussurean semantics, which excludes the denotative function of language, analyses the signification, the thing itself – the relationship between the “thing” and reality (Ricoeur, 1981: 125; Benveniste, 1988: 60; Howarth, 2000:

11) and that of the semantics of the word, when meaning becomes apparent, realised or transformed only within the mediation of the whole statement/sentence, which relates to the contextualisation of the word within the statement. Indicating the important shift from the *figure-word based* theory to the *sentence-based* theory (semantics), hermeneutics formulates metaphor as “work in miniature” since both text and metaphor, world and word fall under the one and same category, that of discourse (Ricoeur, 1974: 97; 1981, 217–256). Where the word and sentence are two poles of a single semantic entity, together alone they form a meaning and reference. In the ‘position’ of the reference (extra-linguistic reality or the object), metaphors hold the power to transform reality. Discourse alludes to the extra-linguistic reality, i.e., to its referent, “...the shift of meaning which needs the contribution of the whole text, effects on words...” (Ricoeur, 1974: 96).

Ricoeur uses the Aristotelian notion of tragedy to further elaborate the hermeneutical understanding of metaphor – the undividable relationship between *muthos* (Aristotelian conception of the story, narration) and *lexis* (the reference) where the meaning of metaphor is only possible within *muthos*, that is, within the discourse as a whole. In the Ricoeurian definition, the ‘power’ of metaphor is *lexis*, namely the reference, but a metaphorical sense is solely possible in the immanent relation to the whole text (Aristotelian *muthos*) (Ricoeur, 1973; 1981: 259–280). Understanding of the work as a whole provides the ‘key’ to the metaphor (Ricoeur, 1973: 107), the interpretation – hermeneutical circle – unveils the new form of being, i.e., the metaphor. Ricoeur’s positioning of metaphor in the sphere of references to co-construct the world and Aristotle’s notion of *mimesis* (Greek, to unveil the world) establishes the strategic ‘nature’ of metaphor – fabrication, construction and creation (Ricoeur, 1973: 109). Ricoeur’s metaphor exists at the intersection of the story (discourse), its distinctive parts and as diction (reference), which directs and creates it at the same time.

### The (post)Marxist and (post)structural implications for metaphor

Poststructuralist and (post)Marxist theory and ontology allow for an innovative conceptualisation of metaphor that moves away from the tradition of the linguistic, conceptual and hermeneutic theory of metaphor. Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy of power and discourse show the possibility of re-inventing metaphor within discourse theory. Foucault’s notion of statement, as a non-linguistic entity, as an assemblage/set of articulations and actualisations, that is, specific forms which culminate in discourse, position metaphor in the field of ‘power relations’. Discussing metaphor as an element of Foucault’s discourse, produced within the immanence of the power-knowledge structure, is an innovative approach that allows us to

differently evaluate the role and power of metaphor within the political. To do so, Jakobson and De Saussure's structural theory of language must be taken into account. This is also a point of departure from hermeneutics (and cognitive linguist) discourse, and of entry to the (post)Marxist and (post) structuralist 'definition' of language/discourse where metaphor 'becomes' a practice of language and is hence epistemologically effective.

De Saussure's structural linguistic theory develops the "relational theory of language". Language is a 'system of differences' where meaning and identity are produced within the (relational) relationship of signifier and signified. De Saussure breaks with the transparency of language in relation to the object, which lies at the heart of hermeneutics. The structure, the symbolic order, as a 'empty field' of variation of relations (Lacan and Deleuze, 2004), or the Foucauldian (2010a) 'radical event' – the play of differences – is what determines the sense, meaning, reality and truth (*cf.* Foucault, 1994: 217) Language is arbitrary. All that exists is only its function and convention. De Saussure (in Howarth, 2000: 19; de Saussure, 1977: 81) draws on the notion of language, where there is no natural relationship between the signifier and signified: "in language there are just differences...the system of language is a set of differences ... and in a particular set of differences the system of values emerges" (de Saussure, 1974: 81). The *relational* and *differential* concept of language is an essential element of structuralism: every structure represents two aspects, a system of differential relations in which the symbolic elements are mutually determined and the system of singularity that corresponds to these relations and delineates the space of structure (Deleuze, 2004). If we simplify the Deleuzian notion and use Foucault's conception of discourse, the symbolic order or the structure as a relational relationship determines the position of the subject (Foucault, 2010a; 2003). Meaning (sense) arises from the combination of the elements that in themselves hold no meaning. Ducrot (1988; Šumič-Riha, 1988: 51) made a similar assumption: in discourse, there are rules and forces which are not outside the discourse ('the material reality'), but are immanent to every discourse, they are not decisive for his discourse, but constitute the discursive situation itself in which discourse proceeds from the relationship with the speaker.

From the de Saussurean structural principle of language as autonomous order, Ducrot develops the theory of discourse as a *historical event*. The statement is an event; "the realisation of the statement is the historic event, that is the emergence of a statement", and Ducrot (1988: 178) regards that emergence as an "enunciation", neither as an act nor as someone's possession, but the fact of the emergence of the statement. Ducrot's (1988: 241) *polyphonic theory* of discourse refutes the conception where subject is the ultimate author, the producer of the statement, and the source of meaning. The statement has a 'gap' – the meaning of the statement is never identical

to what the speaker ought/intended to say (Ducrot, 1988: 260). The statement is never identical to enunciation. "Communication thought" is never the same as the thought of the speaking subject – what was said/uttered is never identical to the 'thing' that the speaking subject intended (Ducrot, 1988: 260).

The meaning of a statement is constituted within the culmination of different elements of discourse, where the simplest sentence is produced through dialogue, and not with the authority of a subject. The 'performative' statement influences reality. In a similar manner, Voloshinov and Bahtin (2005) underlined the historical aspect of discourse production, somehow trivial to Saussure's hegemony of the sign, as Ricoeur notes. Voloshin's 'ideological turn' in language and Bahtin's *dialogical nature* of language enabled language to be 'bound' to reality, to think language as neither an instrument nor a grammatical element, but in its effective function, as an articulation of reality. Voloshinov understands sign in its 'ideological charge', the moment that allows language to be connected to the material reality of human psychological and social practices. Although language is not a simple reflection of reality as objectivists would claim, it is a grasping of reality through language, which as practical consciousness pervades all social 'being'; language is an articulation of active and changing experiences in the world (Williams, 2005: 136). Consequently, meaning is an inevitable social act, depending on social relationships (Williams, 2005: 136). Bahtinian language is immanently ideological and material. Opposing de Saussure's 'hegemony' of structure/form, Bahtin (2005, 17) thinks of language as a practice: language-speaking is not an abstract system of linguistic forms, nor an isolated monological statement, not even a psychophysiological act of its realisation. Language is a *social event* of speaking inter-action that is realised within the statement and statements. Speech as a 'living dialogue' (Bahtin and Vološinov, 2005: 61) is an essential reality of language.

Structure, the symbolic order in Lacanian and Deleuzean's "language", is the moment where the imaginary is eliminated from the language. The structure determines the meaning. It is determined in the series of differences, in the relations between the signifier and signified (not in the relation to the object), the precise relation that determines the identity, the very truth. Meaning/sense arises from the combination of elements that are shifted through the structure and which by themselves have no meaning. Jakobson's structuralist notion of language depicts specific implications of metaphor (and metonymy). Metaphor and metonymy are not perceived as figures of imagination, but fundamental structural 'components' – indicating movement from one series to another and within the same series (Deleuze, 2004). In Laclau's view, Jakobson provides the ground for a strategic notion of discourse. Ricoeur also indicates that with the broadening

of the de Saussurean model of language Jakobson allows metaphor to enter into discourse. Jakobson's theory of *two types of aphasic disturbances* defines the constitution and workings of discourse. The mutual implication of 'metaphoric chain' and 'metonymic mesh' form a specific discourse where Laclau (2009) sees the totalisation effects on discourse. The functioning of language through two different operations, *combination and contextualisation*, by which the sign obtains its location and *selection and substitution*, by which the sign can be replaced, indicates the mutual implication of metaphor and metonymy (Jakobson, 1989/1996: 89). This brings rhetorical categories to their specific locations (Laclau, 2009: 6), whereby metaphor and metonymy are not just figures among others, but as Laclau (2009: 6) points out, the two fundamental matrices around which all other figures and tropes should be ordered. Jakobson 'models' a movement of discourse on the axis of similarity and association, the aphasia on both axes results in the concentration on either axis (Jakobson, 1989/1996: 89). Fixation of the meaning for Jakobson always depends on the wider sets of cultural practices (specific individual styles, practices and habits).

Laclau's discourse is immanently constituted as a 'mixture' of metaphor-metonymy circulation, intersected by rhetoric as a dimension of signification that has no limits in its field of operation (Laclau, 2009). Accordingly, Laclau indicates that discourse is every practice of signification connected to social life. As there is no distinction between the signification and activity (Laclau and Muffe, 1985; Laclau, 2009), if words, actions and effects are interdependent networks, then the de Saussurean categories signifier/signified, paradigmatic/syntagmatic aspect quit being linguistic categories as the synchronic method anticipates. In Laclau's (2009) opinion, if we theorise them appropriately, these categories could define relations at work in the field of common ontology; otherwise, rhetoric could not be ontologically constitutive. If we think of any identity or truth as a construction, then we are implying shifts/crossing from metaphor to metonymy: from the starting point of association (metonymic relation) to its consolidation in analogy (metaphoric relation) (Laclau, 2009). This is how the construction of a specific identity or hegemonic discourse is created.

We have tried to show that Ducrot, Voloshinov and Bahtin provide the grounds for thinking about metaphor as part of the wider discursive practices. This connects with Foucault's conceptualisation of metaphor within power strategies. Bahtin and Voloshinov's notion of language as being dialogically "produced" and their "disclosure" of a sign in its immanent materiality is valuable. Bahtin with *heteroglossia* (opposite to monological language) introduces the idea that language is a strategy, implying that diverse strategies are displayed in language. Thus, heterogeneous meanings, which are reflected in language similar to Ricoeur's notion of the inherent creativity

of language, demonstrate that language reveals/indicates social speech/language, which shows the ideological and material 'nature' of a sign. In this sense, sign is not a linguistic element, but a social event of speech interactions that is realised in the statement. Language in this diachronic perspective is a social practice. With Bahtinian's "dialogical language" and Voloshinov's "ideological sign", metaphor 'clashes' with the very materiality.

In the last part of this article, we show that neither Bahtin nor Foucault consider *structure* to be perfectly homogenous and uniform. In the Foucauldian sense, power (relations) penetrate the entire socio-political body. In the Bahtinian and Voloshinov senses, "social sign" is produced within (and a product of) the "arena of class struggles". Discourses are material, they emerge in different relations, and in the language interaction: language is a social event of language interactions, realised with statement(s) (Bahtin, 2005: 61). Ducrot similarly considers a statement as an historic event, where precisely the appearance of this statement is an enunciation (Ducrot, 1988: 178). Consequently, the meaning of a statement is apparent within the confrontation and crossing of different voices (Ducrot's polyphonic theory). It is constituted within the culmination of various discourses. If we acknowledge Voloshinov's "ideological sign", or go along with Bahtin's *heteroglossia*, or if we argue with Foucault and Ducrot's conception of discourse: a statement is an event where language as everything uttered/enunciated (Ducrot) and said (Foucault) induces/effects and enables discourses. Metaphor can thus depart from the linguistic tradition and definitions. Ducrot, Voloshinov and Bahtin provide the basis for a strategic notion of metaphor. In Laclau's explanation of the totalisation of discourse, strategic *metaphoric-metonymic movements*, shifts and intersections, constitute hegemonic discourse or (temporarily) determine particular political identity. For Laclau, discourse or hegemonic identity 'resides' at the intersection/crossroads of metaphor and metonymy as strategic movements or continuous antagonisms that form discourses on one or the other side of 'the end'. Language as a system of differences, where 'antagonism' is failure of difference, can exist only in its interruptions - that is as metaphor (Laclau, 1985).

### **Metaphor as a political technology**

In Foucault's formulation of discourse, *statement as an event* shows two aspects of discourse: contingency and historical development in language. Foucault asserts that the historicity of the statement must be restored and so it is developed in the relations of power rather than in the relations of meaning (Foucault, 2008: 116). A statement as a series of what is actually said, written or uttered, on its surface (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 45) is Foucault's "order of discourse" (2008: 26) - that is, the nature of the event

and nullification of the signifier<sup>1</sup>. Although Foucault never addressed the function of metaphor within discourse, we can draw certain methodological/theoretical conclusions from his work: metaphor should be analysed on the level of event, which contradicts/negates the assumption of the origin; metaphor should be analysed as a series of enunciations in contrast to the metaphor as a unit of the statement; regularities should be traced in contrast to the original/identity or the original meaning; identification of the conditions for the possibility of emergence in contrast with identification of the real meaning. Discourse in Foucault's (2008: 116) sense does not refer to the unsaid or not meant, but to discontinuity, involving all practices that intersect or fuse, ignore or exclude; it does not dwell on the interplay of meanings of a certain pre-discursiveness. Discourse is a practice and within this practice discursive events acquire the principle of their regularity – i.e., the discourse does not imply truth, meaning or sense, but on the level of discourse itself its conditions of existence can be detected. In this vein, a metaphor is neither a figure, a tool nor a word whose essence is to produce diverse and multiple meanings. Being intrinsic to discourse, metaphor is the culmination of different discursive practices and articulations. It must be examined as a singular event that neither language nor meaning can exhaust (cf. Foucault, 2002: 130). In Foucault's event, there is immanent contingency in its singularity. This means that reasoning about metaphor should be outside the 'meaning-perception' (trans)formative role and instead take metaphor as an epistemological determinant that produces (communicates) knowledge of the world and to the world.

In line with Foucault's reasoning, metaphor seems to be immanent to every discourse. As such, it becomes epistemologically productive/effective. Similarly as with knowledge, power is always present:

*Power must [...] be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands of some, and it is never appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity can be appropriated. Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them.* (Foucault, 2003a: 29)

<sup>1</sup> Foucault's subject is to be analysed as a complex discursive function. The proper question is not who speaks, but the real question we should pose is to identify the modes of discourse, that is, the different modalities of enunciation: "[...] discourse is not majestically unfolding manifestation of thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary a totality in which dispersion of a subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined" (Foucault, 1972: 55).

Foucault's "analytics of power" stresses that every discourse is a constitution/product of power relations (and produces them). Discourses in this sense are "transparent" (Kelly, 2009) and the question is no longer what the unsaid or the real meaning is, but for whom it serves (Foucault, 2008: 119; Kelly, 2009). Discourse as a set of discursive practices outlines the "nature of metaphor and metaphorical" – in every statement there are circulations of power and its effects (Foucault, 2008: 114–115). As we observed with Laclau's (2009: 75) assertion that *metaphoric-metonymic movement* is what is immanent to discourse, i.e., the inherent strategic play that temporarily determines the 'hegemonic discourse' (sublime metaphorical fixation) and at the same time acknowledges its contingency (moderate metonymic association), Foucault's notion of power – present in any relationship and relation (Kelly, 2009; Foucault, 2010b), it is relational and dispersed, intentional and non-subjective (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 187; Foucault, 2010b) – provides the grounds for taking the strategies of metaphorical and metaphor even further. It is not about the production of additional/surplus meanings that ought to be analysed, but that procedures, techniques and technologies are the new ways of examining metaphor. In turn, the real question is what kind of relations is a metaphor producing in particular socio-political contexts, how it inscribes itself into the socio-political body. Metaphor should be examined within the "meshes of power" or "economies of power" (*cf.* Foucault, 2008: 120). Metaphor should be examined as a specific strategy of power: as a game of strategies that are mobile, transformative and reversible, including relationships between the people and relationships that they have with themselves (Foucault, 2010b: 252; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 204).

Foucault's *economies of power* or *meshes of power* demonstrate the pervasiveness of power that spreads throughout the whole socio-political body, depicting the failure of any objectivity, or any possibility of truth. Applying this to different theories of metaphor that rely on the assumption that some kind of 'objective law' exists, implying that certainty, true meaning, could be known or discovered by a 'deep' investigation (interpretation), despite refuting literal meaning as objective truth. What we see with Foucault is that every meaning is caught in the meshes of power, every truth is a product of specific 'economies of power', every language practice is where power effects become visible, and every metaphor, despite being 'different', is an object of the same power/knowledge dispositive.

A metaphor is about telling the truth in every single moment. Not an 'excess' of meaning, but as something that we are still understanding as metaphor, even though it is part of the same strategies of truth:

*What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations, which have been*

*enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten are illusions ... metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins. (Nietzsche, 2019: 6-7)*

Fearless speech, as Foucault would describe truth telling, is the terrain where “metaphorical interplay” reveals itself in strategies of power. Truth constantly appears in varying forms, conceals itself with different masks, seems elusive, yet at other times is apparent, visible and liberating. However, in the moment we wish to seize it, in a moment of our awareness, to discover a real, truthful meaning, when we make sense of our being, as we have been embodying it, the precise moment when we think that we are expressing it, the truth that we are so eager to grasp disappears in intermission, loses itself in the ashes of discourses, in the said, but not really meant. In relation to *parrhesia*, metaphor uncovers its ‘true nature’ – as neither a tool, a figure nor the interplay of words and thoughts, but as a political technology that circulates around the truth, around the true meaning, consistently shifts its game (of meanings), accumulates multiple discourses, displaces and so clearly divides the subject in his belief that what he is is truly him, and what he speaks is the truth (Foucault, 2009).

Metaphor exposes the truth, the ‘true’ meaning or nature of every identity in immanent contingency, raptures and fluidity, revealing metaphorical circulation in every ‘word’ we say, in every view we have, in every activity we participate in. The meshes in truth, its immanent ruptures, are not what determines its character. The truth is the ‘economy’ of discourses that repeatedly (re)constitute it, the ‘politics’ which establishes and destroys it. In these ruptures and meshes, metaphor emerges as the Aristotelian *techne* or a Foucauldian technology of procedures and techniques. Metaphorical play constitutes every discourse, but at the moment of our certainty dissolves it in an instance.

To speak the truth in metaphors appears to be the work of an autonomous individual. However, any use of metaphors is not about ‘escaping’ power, but restoring it, with new ‘rules’ and new ‘laws’ that determine the place of the emergence of truth. Metaphor is to be understood as a ‘strategic instance’, which continually circuits in the discursive field, and within the struggle of diverse discourses determines the rules of the un-true. In this sense, metaphor is a specific political technology, a strategy of power, that decides about the *regimes* of truth. Metaphor, as a technology, is a struggle over the status of the truth.

## Conclusion

In this article, we wanted to go beyond the established methodological and theoretical visions of metaphor and open it up in terms of new functionalities. We sought to widen the possible scope of metaphor for analysing socio-political realities. We showed how metaphor as a strategy gives insight into how power relations determine a particular hegemonic discourse. The contemporary linguistic theories, where we mostly analysed the theories of metaphor put forward by Ricoeur, Lakoff and Johnson, rightly assumes that metaphor can be understood only within the socio-cultural context, but simultaneously these theories assert that the creative-polysemic nature of language and mind is what ontologically produces metaphorical meaning. The 'power' of metaphor manifests itself in generating multiple meanings and in the sense of these approaches we process reality, give meaning to events, discover, and perceive the world in a given way. It is seen as a subjective endeavour whereby while interacting humans produce meanings as interpretations and creations of reality.

Contrary to the mentioned theories, with Foucault we showed that meanings are always already present and hence subjectively-creative ontological (re)creations of 'classical' theories of metaphor miss the realities of power/truth relations. It is instead power relations that constitute the metaphor as immanent to every discourse and something that circulates throughout the socio-political body. Any attempt to fix meanings as such is bound to fail due to the (re)creative nature of discourses and power relations. In this sense, metaphors are political technologies that reflect and create wider socio-political practices. A new potential avenue of research insights into the function of metaphors is thereby opened.

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